On the class of cycle-free directed graph games with transferable utility solution concepts, called web values, are introduced axiomatically, each one with respect to some specific choice of a management team of the graph. We provide their explicit formula representation and simple recursive algorithms to calculate them. Additionally the efficiency and stability of web values are studied. Web values may be considered as natural extensions of the tree and sink values as has been defined correspondingly for rooted and sink forest graph games. In case the management team consists of all sources (sinks) in the graph a kind of tree (sink) value is obtained. In general, at a web value each player receives the worth of this player together with his subordinates minus the total worths of these subordinates. It implies that every coalition of players consisting of a player with all his subordinates receives precisely its worth. We also define the average web value as the average of web values over all management teams in the graph. As application the water distribution problem of a river with multiple sources, a delta and possibly islands is considered.
Introduction
In standard cooperative game theory it is assumed that any coalition of players may form. However, in many practical situations the collection of coalitions that can be formed is restricted by some social, economical, hierarchical, communication, or technical structure. The study of games with transferable utility and limited cooperation introduced by means of communication graphs was initiated by Myerson sen management team (anti-chain in the digraph). Section 4 investigates a particular case when the control is going from the top to the bottom, which provides the socalled tree value. In Section 5 the general case of web values is studied. The average web value is introduced in Section 6. In Section 7 the application to the water distribution problem of a river with multiple sources, a delta and possibly islands is considered.
Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair N, v , where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n, n ≥ 2, players and v : 2 N → IR is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition and the associated real number v(S) represents the worth of coalition S. The set of TU games with fixed player set N we denote G N . For simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write v when we refer to a TU game
for all S, T ⊆ N . A value on a subset G of G N is a function ξ : G → IR N that assigns to every game v ∈ G a vector ξ(v) ∈ IR N ; the number ξ i (v) represents the payoff to player i, i ∈ N , in the game v. In the sequel we use standard notation x(S) = i∈S x i , x S = (x i ) i∈S for any x ∈ IR N and S ⊆ N , |A| for the cardinality of a finite set A, and omit brackets when writing one-player coalitions such as i instead of {i}, i ∈ N .
For a game v ∈ G N , a payoff vector x ∈ IR N is efficient if x(N ) = v(N ) and is feasible if x(N ) ≤ v(N ).
The core [3] of a game v ∈ G N is defined as
For a game v ∈ G N we may also consider the weak core defined as
A value ξ on a subset G of G N is stable if for any game v ∈ G it holds that ξ(v) ∈ C(v), and a value ξ on G is weakly stable if for any game v ∈ G it holds that ξ(v) ∈C(v).
The cooperation structure on the player set N is specified by a graph, directed or undirected, on N . An undirected graph on N consists of a set of nodes, being the elements of N , and a collection of unordered pairs of nodes Γ ⊆ Γ c N , where Γ c N = { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i = j} is the complete undirected graph without loops on N and an unordered pair {i, j} ∈ Γ is a link between i, j ∈ N . A directed graph, or digraph, on N is given by a collection of ordered pairs of nodes Γ ⊆Γ c N , wherē Γ c N = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i = j} is the complete directed graph without loops on N and an ordered pair (i, j) ∈ Γ is a directed link between i, j ∈ N . In this paper we study cooperation structures represented by directed graphs. A subset Γ of a (directed or undirected) graph Γ on N is a subgraph of Γ . For a subgraph Γ of a digraph Γ on N , N (Γ ) ⊆ N is the set of nodes in Γ , i.e., N (Γ ) = {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N : {(i, j), (j, i)} ∩ Γ = ∅}. For a digraph Γ on N and a coalition S ⊆ N , the subgraph of Γ on S is the digraph Γ | S = {(i, j) ∈ Γ | i, j ∈ S} on S.
In a graph Γ on N a sequence of different nodes p = (i 1 , . . . , i r ), r ≥ 2, is a path in Γ from node i 1 to node i r if for h = 1, . . . , r−1 it holds that {i h , i h+1 } ∈ Γ when Γ is undirected and {(i h , i h+1 ), (i h+1 , i h )}∩Γ = ∅ when Γ is directed. In a digraph Γ a path p = (i 1 , . . . , i r ) is a directed path from node i 1 to node i r if for all h = 1, . . . , r−1 it holds that (i h , i h+1 ) ∈ Γ . For a digraph Γ on N and any i, j ∈ N we denote by P Γ (i, j) the set of all directed paths from i to j in Γ . Any node i of a (directed) path p we denote as an element of p, i.e., i ∈ p. Moreover, when for a directed path p in a digraph Γ we write (i, j) ∈ p, we assume that i and j are consecutive nodes in p. For any set P of (directed) paths, by N (P ) = {i ∈ p | p ∈ P } we denote the set of nodes determining the paths in P . In a digraph Γ a directed link (i, j) ∈ Γ for which there exists a directed path p in Γ from i to j such that p = (i, j) is inessential, otherwise (i, j) is an essential link. In a digraph Γ a directed path p is a proper path if it contains only essential links.
Given a graph Γ on N , two nodes i and j in N are connected in Γ if there exists a path in Γ from node i to node j. Γ is connected if any two nodes in N are connected. A coalition S ⊆ N is connected in Γ if the subgraph Γ | S on S is connected. For a coalition S ⊆ N , C Γ (S) is the set of all connected subcoalitions of S in Γ , S/Γ is the set of maximally connected subcoalitions of S in Γ , called the components of S in Γ , and (S/Γ ) i is the component of S in Γ containing player i ∈ S.
For a digraph Γ on N and any i, j ∈ N , j is a (proper) successor of i and i is a (proper) predecessor of j if there is a directed (proper) path from i to j. For a directed (essential) link (i, j) ∈ Γ , i is the origin and j is the terminus, i is a (proper) immediate predecessor of j and j is a (proper) immediate successor or (proper) follower of i. Node j ∈ N is a brother of node i ∈ N if both have a same predecessor in Γ . For i ∈ N , we denote by P Γ (i) the set of predecessors of i in Γ , by O Γ (i) the set of immediate predecessors of i in Γ , by O * Γ (i) the set of proper immediate predecessors of i, by F Γ (i) the set of immediate successors of i in Γ , by F * Γ (i) the set of proper immediate successors of i, by S Γ (i) the set of successors of i in Γ , and by B Γ (i) the set of brothers of i. Moreover, for i ∈ N , we definē
For a digraph Γ on N and a node i ∈ N , the set W Γ (i) = S Γ (i) ∪ P Γ (i) ∪ i defines the web of i in Γ with i being its hub, and all j ∈ W Γ (i)\{i} are called subordinates of i. A coalition S ⊆ N is a full successors set in Γ , if S =S Γ (i) for some i ∈ N , and is a full predecessors set in Γ , if S =P Γ (i) for some i ∈ N . A node i ∈ N having no predecessor in Γ , i.e., P Γ (i) = ∅, is a source in Γ . A node i ∈ N having no successor in Γ , i.e., S Γ (i) = ∅, is a sink in Γ . For any S ⊆ N we denote by R Γ (S) the set of sources in Γ | S and by L Γ (S) the set of sinks in Γ | S . For simplicity of notation, for a digraph Γ on N and i ∈ N , by Γ i we denote the subgraph Γ |S Γ (i) and by Γ i the subgraph Γ |P Γ (i) . Given a digraph Γ on N and a node i ∈ N , the in-degree of i is given by d Γ (i) = |O * Γ (i)| and the out-degree of i byd Γ (i) = |F * Γ (i)|, and for j ∈ S Γ (i) the in-degree of j with respect to i is given by d i (j) = |O * Γ i (j)| and for any j ∈ P Γ (i) the out-degree of j with respect to i is given by d i (j) = |F * Γ i (j)|. Given a digraph Γ on N and a set of paths P ⊆ P Γ (i, j), i ∈ N , j ∈ S Γ (i), a node h ∈ N ( P ) such that d i (h) · d j (h) > 1 is called a proper intersection point in N ( P ). The subset of N ( P ) composed by i, j, all proper immediate successors h ∈ F * Γ (i) ∩ N ( P ) of i and all proper intersection points in N ( P ) defines the upper covering set C( P ) for P , and the subset of N ( P ) composed by i, j, all proper immediate predecessors h ∈ O * Γ (j) ∩ N ( P ) of j and all proper intersection points in N ( P ) defines the lower covering setC( P ) for P .
For any digraph Γ on N , i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i), the set of paths P Γ (i, j) can be partitioned into a number of separate subsets of two types, possibly only one subset of one or another type, or a subset containing only one path, such that paths from different subsets do not intersect between i and j, in subsets of the first type all paths belonging to the same subset have at least one common node different from i and j, and in each subset of the second type paths do intersect but have no other nodes in common than i and j. More exactly, given a digraph Γ on N , for every i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i) there exist two integers q ij ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ q ij ≤ q ij , and a partition
contains no directed cycles, i.e., no node is a successor of itself. A digraph Γ on N is strongly cycle-free if it is cycle-free and contains no cycles. Remark that in a strongly cycle-free digraph all links are essential.
A cycle-free directed graph Γ on N is a (rooted) tree if it has only one source, called the root and denoted r(Γ ), and for any other node in N there is a unique directed path in Γ from the root to this node. A directed graph Γ on N is a sink tree if it has only one sink and for any other node in N there is a unique directed path in Γ from this node to the sink. A directed graph Γ is a (rooted or sink) forest if it is composed by a number of disjoint (rooted or sink) trees. A line-graph is a forest in which each node has at most one immediate successor and at most one immediate predecessor. Both a rooted tree and a sink tree, and in particular a line-graph, are strongly cycle-free. A subgraph T of a digraph Γ is a subtree of Γ if T is a tree on N (T ). A subtree T of Γ is a full subtree if its node set consists of the root r(T ) all successors of r(T ), i.e., N (T ) =S Γ (r(T )). A full subtree T of Γ is a maximal subtree if the root r(T ) is a source of Γ .
In what follows it is assumed that the cooperation structure on the player set N is specified by a cycle-free directed graph, not necessarily being strongly cycle-free. A pair v, Γ of a TU-game v ∈ G N and a cycle-free directed communication graph Γ on N constitutes a game with cycle-free digraph communication structure and is called a directed cycle-free graph game or cycle-free digraph game. The set of all cycle-free digraph games on a fixed player set N is denoted G Γ N . A value on a subset G of G Γ N is a function ξ : G → IR N that assigns to every cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G a vector of payoffs ξ(v, Γ ) ∈ IR N . For any graph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N , a payoff vector x ∈ IR N is component efficient if for every component C ∈ N/Γ it holds that x(C) = v(C), and x is component feasible if for every component C ∈ N/Γ it holds that x(C) ≤ v(C).
Web connectedness and management teams
For a directed link in an arbitrary digraph there are two different interpretations possible. One interpretation is that a link is directed to indicate which player has initiated the communication, but at the same time it represents a fully developed communication link. In such a case, following Myerson [6] , it is assumed that cooperation is possible among any set of connected players, i.e., the coalitions in which players are able to cooperate, the productive coalitions, are all the connected coalitions. In this case the focus is on component efficient values. Another interpretation of a directed link assumes that a directed link represents the only one-way communication situation. In that case not every connected coalition might be productive. In this paper we abide by the second interpretation of a directed link and consider different scenarios possible for controlling cooperation and creation of productive coalitions under the assumption of one-directional communication.
In a directed graph every player is able to communicate only with his successors and his predecessors with whom he is connected via directed paths and no communication is possible with other players. In general any player can be chosen as a manager for controlling the situation and he keeps control over his full web set that in this case can be interpreted as the set of his subordinates. For a coalition of players to create a management team the necessary conditions are, first, that they are independent from each other, and second, that they all together keep control over the entire society represented by N .
Given a digraph Γ the set of all possible management teams we denote by M(Γ ). We write M (Γ ) instead of M when we need to emphasize that management team M depends on graph Γ . Remark that a management team is an antichain in terms of graph theory.
Observe that we prescribe the subordination of players in a given digraph Γ when we choose a management team. It is easy to see that for every i ∈ N there exists at least one management team M(Γ ) containing i. Whence, in particular, it follows that some managers might be simply sources or sinks in Γ . Moreover, there exist two particular management teams -one composed by all sources in Γ and another one composed by all sinks in Γ . Furthermore, as a consequence of condition (ii), we obtain that each management team is minimal since W Γ (M \{j}) = N for all j ∈ M . It is important to notice that the set of successors of M in Γ given by Given a digraph Γ on N and management team M ∈ M(Γ ), to keep the subordination prescribed by M we define the management team M (S) of a coalition S ⊆ N induced by M as a subcoalition of S composed by (i) all managers in M that belong to S, (ii) all predecessors of M in Γ belonging to S that are not covered by the web W Γ | S (M ∩ S) and all whose immediate successors belong to S Γ (M ), (iii) all successors of M in Γ belonging to S that are not covered by the web W Γ | S (M ∩ S) and all whose immediate predecessors belong to P Γ (M ) except those that are already covered by (ii), (iv) all predecessors of M in Γ that are sinks in S, (v) all successors of M in Γ that are sources in S, i.e.,
It is not difficult to check that this procedure uniquely defines M (S) and that M (S) is a management team in the subgraph Γ | S . Moreover, M (S) inherits the subordination in M in the sense that if i ∈ P Γ (M ) ∩ S then i ∈ P Γ | S (M (S)) and if i ∈ S Γ (M ) ∩ S then i ∈ S Γ | S (M (S)). In case when a directed link binding a manager is broken we admit the following rule. Observe that in the first case it is not necessarily the case that the adjunct manager j is a source in Γ \{(i, j)} because j may have predecessors among players in P Γ (M ), in particular, j might be a sink in Γ \{(i, j)} (see Example 1 below). A similar remark concerns the second case when the adjunct manager k is not a sink in Γ \{(k, i)} when k has successors among players in S Γ (M ). In real-life situations usually no one accepts that one of his subordinates becomes his equal partner if a coalition forms. So, given a digraph Γ on N and a management team M ∈ M(Γ ), we assume that the only productive coalitions are the so-called M -web connected coalitions, for a digraph Γ being the connected coalitions S ∈ C Γ (N ) that meet the condition that for every manager i ∈ M (S) it holds that i / ∈ W Γ (j) for any other manager j ∈ M (S). It is not difficult to see that the latter condition guarantees that every M -web connected coalition inherits the subordination of players prescribed by M in Γ . Obviously, every component C ∈ N/Γ is M -web connected. Moreover, any full web set in Γ with its hub being a manager in M is M -web connected. A M -web connected coalition is full M -web connected if it together with its management team contains also all their subordinates. Observe that a full M -web connected coalition is the union of several full webs sets. In what follows we assume that for every cycle-free digraph Γ on N some management team M ∈ M(Γ ) is a priori fixed. The set of cycle-free digraph games v, Γ , M on N with management team M, M ∈ M(Γ ), we denote by G Γ,M N . For efficiency of a value we require that every M -web connected coalition composed by one of the managers together with all subordinates of this manager fully realizes its worth. This gives the first axiom a value must satisfy, called web efficiency.
WE generalizes the usual definition of efficiency for a (rooted/sink) tree. Indeed, in a (rooted) tree when it is assumed that there is only one manager -its root, the web efficiency just says that the total payoff should be equal to the worth of the grand coalition N . A similar remark holds true for a sink tree with only one sink-manager as well. Still, WE is not the productive component efficiency condition. Different from the Myerson [6] case with undirected communication graph we assume that not every productive component is able to realize its exact capacity but only those with a web structure. For example, if one worker works in two different divisions, the two managers of these firms and the worker create a productive coalition. Yet, it is impossible to guarantee the efficiency of this coalition because there is no communication link between the managers of the two divisions.
The next two axioms reflect the desirable property of stability of the management system -any changes on the upper levels of the management hierarchy should not destroy the stable performance at the lower levels. The first axiom, called web successor equivalence, says that if a link with the terminus being a successor of a given management team is deleted, the terminus of this link and all his successors still receive the same payoff.
WSE means that the payoff to any member in the full successors set of any player being a successor of the given management team does not change if any of the immediate predecessors of that player breaks his link to that player. It implies that for every successors set of a successor or member of the given management team the payoff distribution is completely determined by the players of this set.
The second axiom, called web predecessor equivalence, says that if a link with the origin being a predecessor of a given management team is deleted, the origin of this link and all his predecessors still receive the same payoff.
WPE means that the payoff to any member in the full predecessors set of any player being a predecessor of the given management team does not change if any of the immediate successors of that player breaks his link to that player. It implies that for every predecessors set of a predecessor or member of the given management team the payoff distribution is completely determined by the players of this set.
Along with WE we consider also two stronger efficiency properties requiring that the full sets of subordinates of any player are able to realize their full capacity. Web full-tree efficiency and web full-sink efficiency require correspondingly that every full successors set within the set of successors of a given management team and every full predecessors set within the set of predecessors of a given management team realize their worths.
The tree value
Consider first the situation when a management team is composed by the set of all sources of a given graph.
Axiomatic definition
In this case web connectedness can be restated in terms of tree connectedness. For a digraph Γ a connected coalition S ∈ C Γ (N ) is tree connected, or simply t-connected, if it meets the condition that for every source i ∈ R Γ (S) it holds that i / ∈ S Γ (j) for any other source j ∈ R Γ (S). A t-connected coalition is full t-connected, if it together with its sources contains all successors of these sources. Observe that a full t-connected coalition is the union of one or more full successors sets.
In what follows for a cycle-free digraph Γ on N and a coalition S ⊆ N , let C t Γ (S) denote the set of all t-connected subsets of S, [S/Γ ] t the set of maximally t-connected subsets of S, called the t-connected components of S, and [S/Γ ] t i the t-connected component of S containing player i ∈ S.
In the considered case web efficiency reduces to maximal-tree efficiency, web successor equivalence to successor equivalence and web full-tree efficiency to fulltree efficiency, while the axioms of web predecessor equivalence and web full-sink efficiency become redundant.
Proposition 1 On the class of cycle-free digraph games G Γ N MTE and SE together imply FTE.
Proof. Let ξ be a value on G Γ N that meets MTE and SE, and let a cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N be arbitrarily chosen. For every given i ∈ N , the subgraph Γ i is a maximal tree in the subgraph
By successive application of SE,
i.e., the value ξ meets FTE.
Given a digraph Γ on N , for all i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i) we define
where, for r = 0, 1, . . . , n − 2, κ r ij is the number of tuples (i 0 , . . . , i r+1 ) such that
It turns out that MTE and SE uniquely define a value on the class of cycle-free digraph games.
Theorem 1 On the class of cycle-free digraph games G Γ N there is a unique value t that satisfies MTE and SE. For every cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N , the value t(v, Γ ) satisfies the following conditions:
(i) it obeys the recursive equality
Proof. Due to Proposition 1 the value t on G Γ N that satisfies MTE and SE meets FTE as well, wherefrom the recursive equality (4) follows straightforwardly. Next, we show that the representation in the form (4) is equivalent to the representation in the form (5) . According to (4) it holds for the value t that every player receives what this player together with his successors can get on their own, their worth, minus what all his successors will receive by themselves. Since the same property holds for these successors as well, it is not difficult to see that (5) follows directly from (4) by successive substitution. Indeed, for any v, Γ ∈ G Γ N and i ∈ N it holds that
From (5), we obtain immediately that the value t meets SE, because in any digraph Γ for all (i, j) ∈ Γ and k ∈S Γ (j) the full subtrees Γ k and (Γ \(i, j)) k coincide. This completes the proof, since MTE follows from FTE automatically.
According to (4) the value t assigns to every player the worth of his full successors set minus the total payoff to his successors.
Corollary 1 There exists a simple recursive algorithm for computing the value t going upstream from the sinks of the given digraph.
The computation of the coefficients κ ij , i ∈ N , j ∈ S Γ (i), defined by (3) in the explicit formula representation (5) requires, in general, the enumeration of quite a lot of possibilities. We show below that in many cases the coefficients κ ij can be easily computed and the value t can be presented in a computationally more transparent and simpler form. To do that observe first that for a given digraph Γ on N , for any i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i), all nodes forming a tuple (i 0 , ..., i r+1 ) in which
Wherefrom it easily follows that for all i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i), κ ij given by (3) is in fact defined only via tuples of nodes from N ( P Γ (i, j)). For i ∈ N, j ∈ S Γ (i) and S ⊆ N ( P Γ (i, j)) containing nodes i and j, define
where, for r = 0, 1, . . . , n − 2, κ r ij (S) counts all tuples (i 0 , ..., i r+1 ) for which
Theorem 2 For every cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N the value t given by (5) admits the equivalent representation in the form
where, for all i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i), P h , h = 1, ..., q ij , form the partition of P Γ (i, j) defined by (1). If the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, then the above representation reduces to
For rooted-forest digraph games defined by rooted forest digraph structures that are strongly cycle-free, the value given by (8) coincides with the tree value introduced first under the name of hierarchical outcome in Demange [2] , where it is also shown that under the mild condition of superadditivity it belongs to the core of the restricted game defined in Myerson [6] . More recently, the tree value for rootedforest games was used as a basic element in the construction of the average tree solution for cycle-free undirected graph games in Herings et al. [4] . In Khmelnitskaya [5] it is shown that on the class of rooted-forest digraph games the tree value can be characterized via component efficiency and successor equivalence; moreover, it is shown that the class of rooted-forest digraph games is the maximal subclass in the class of strongly cycle-free digraph games where this axiomatization holds true. It is worth to recall that by definition for a rooted-tree digraph game every connected component is a tree. Hence, on the class of rooted-forest digraph games every connected component is productive and maximal-tree efficiency coincides with component efficiency.
From now on we refer to the value t given by (5) , or equivalently by (7) , as to the root-tree value, or simply the tree value, for cycle-free digraph games. The tree value assigns to every player the payoff equal to the worth of his full successors set minus the worths of all full successors sets of his proper immediate successors plus or minus the worths of all full successors sets of any other of his successors that are subtracted or added more than once. For a player i ∈ N and his successor j ∈ N that is not his proper immediate successor, the coefficient κ ij indicates the number of overlappings of full successors sets of all proper immediate successors of i at node j. A player receives what he contributes when he joins his successors when only the full successors sets, that are the only efficient productive coalitions, are counted. Since a sink has no successors, a sink just gets his own worth. It is worth to note and not difficult to check that the right sides of both formulas (7) and (8), being considered with respect not to coalitional worths but to players in these coalitions, contain only player i when taking into account all pluses and minuses.
The validity of the first statement of Theorem 2 follows directly from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 and Corollary 2 to it. The second statement follows easily from the first one. Indeed, in any strongly cycle-free digraph Γ all links are essential, whence F * Γ (i) = F Γ (i), and d i (j) = 1 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i).
Lemma 1 For any digraph Γ on N , the coefficients κ ij , i ∈ N , j ∈ S Γ (i), defined by (3) possess the following properties:
(i) if a link (k, l) ∈ Γ is inessential, then for all i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i), κ ij defined on Γ is equal to κ ij defined on Γ \(k, l);
(ii) κ ij = 1 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ F * Γ (i);
Proof.
(i). It is sufficient to prove the statement only in case when k ∈ S Γ (i) and j ∈ S Γ (l). Let p ∈ P Γ (i, j) be such that p (k, l). By definition of an inessential link there exists p 0 ∈ P Γ (k, l) such that p 0 = (k, l). It is not difficult to see that the path p 1 = p\(k, l) ∪ p 0 obtained from the path p by replacing the link (k, l) by the path p 0 belongs to P Γ (i, j), and moreover, all tuples (i 0 , ..., i r+1 ) in the definition of κ i (j) that belong to p also belong to p 1 . Whence it follows straightforwardly that deleting an inessential link does not change the value of κ ij .
From now without loss of generality we may assume that P Γ (i, j) is composed by only proper paths.
(ii). If j ∈ F * Γ (i), then P Γ (i, j) contains only the path p = (i, j). Wherefrom it follows that κ ij = 1.
(iii). Let j ∈ S Γ (i) \ F * Γ (i). Since paths in P Γ (i, j) are partitioned into subsets of paths P h , h = 1, ..., q ij , such that paths from different subsets do not intersect between i and j, it holds that
Since the paths from different subsets P h do not intersect between i and j, only (i, j) belongs to all paths in p ∈ P Γ (i, j). Therefore, for all k = 2, . . . , q ij ,
Whence it easily follows that
First, let h ∈ {1, ..., q ij }, i.e., the subset of paths P h is of the first type when all paths belonging to P h have at least one common node different from i and j.
Then there exists k ∈ N ( P h ), k = i, j, such that k ∈ p for all p ∈ P h . By definition, κ r ij (N ( P h )) is equal to the number of tuples (i 0 , . . . , i r+1 ) such that i 0 = i, i r+1 = j, i l ∈ S Γ (i l−1 ) ∩ N ( P h ), l = 1, . . . , r + 1, or equivalently, κ r ij is equal to the number of these tuples (i 0 , . . . , i r+1 ) that do not contain k plus the number of these tuples (i 0 , . . . , i r+1 ) that contain k. Since k ∈ p for all p ∈ P h , for every (r + 2)-tuple (i 0 , . . . , i r+1 ) that does not contain k there exists a uniquely defined (r + 3)-tuple composed by the same nodes plus node k. Wherefrom together with equality (6) it follows that κ ij (N ( P h )) = 0.
Next, consider h ∈ {q ij +1, ..., q ij }, i.e., the subset of paths P h is of the second type when all paths belonging to P h do intersect but have no other nodes in common than i and j. We show now that κ ij (N ( P h )) = κ ij (C( P h )). Consider arbitrary k ∈ N ( P h ) \ C( P h ). We may split the computation of κ ij (N ( P h )) into two parts:
where κ ij (N ( P h ); k) counts all tuples in N ( P h ) containing k. By definition of upper covering set, C( P h ) contains some predecessor of k, i.e., C( P h ) ∩ P Γ (k) = ∅. Moreover, since k / ∈ C( P h ), i.e., k is neither a proper immediate successor of i nor a proper intersection point in the subgraph Γ| N ( P h ) , there exists l ∈ C( P h ) ∩ P Γ (k) that belongs to all paths in P h containing k. Applying the same argument as above in the proof of P h of the first type, now with respect to l, we obtain that κ ij (N ( P h ); k) = 0. Thus κ ij (N ( P h )) = κ ij (N ( P h ) \ {k}). Repeating the same reasoning successively with respect to all k ∈ N ( P h ) \ C( P h ) ∪ {k} we obtain κ ij (N ( P h )) = κ ij (C( P h )).
From (iii) of Lemma 1 we easily obtain the following.
Corollary 2 κ ij = 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i) \ F * Γ (i) for which q ij = q ij = 1. In particular, κ ij = 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i) \ F * Γ (i) with d i (j) = 1, since for all j ∈ S Γ (i) \ F * Γ (i) with d i (j) = 1 there is a unique proper immediate predecessor of j that belongs to all paths in P Γ (i, j).
A value ξ on G Γ N is independent of inessential links (IIL) if for every cyclefree digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N and the cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N with Γ being the subgraph Γ of Γ composed by all essential links of Γ it holds that ξ(v, Γ ) = ξ(v, Γ ).
Corollary 3
The tree value t satisfies independence of inessential links.
Example 2
The examples of digraphs depicted in Figure 2 demonstrate the situation when all paths from any P Γ (i, j) constitute one subset of the second type, i.e., paths in P Γ (i, j) do intersect but have no other nodes in common than i and j. For the digraph depicted in Figure 2 .a) we have d 1 (7) = 2 and κ 17 = 0, for the one in Figure 2 .b) we have d 1 (6) = 2 and κ 16 = 1, and for the one in Figure 2 .c) we have d 1 (8) = 2 and κ 18 = −1.
Example 3 Figure 3 provides an example of the tree value for a 10-person game with cycle-free but not strongly cycle-free digraph structure depicted in Figure 1 . If there is no confusion, a set {i 1 , ..., i k } is denoted by i 1 ...i k . The tree value may be computed in two different ways, either by the recursive algorithm based on equality (4) or using the explicit formula representation (7) .
We explain in detail the computation of t 1 (v, Γ ) based on the explicit formula (7): Example 4 Figure 4 gives an example of the tree value for a 10-person game with strongly cycle-free digraph structure. It turns out that the tree value not only meets FTE but FTE alone uniquely defines the tree value on the class of cycle-free digraph games.
Theorem 3 On the class of cycle-free digraph games G Γ N the tree value is the unique value that satisfies FTE.
Proof. Since the tree value satisfies FTE, to prove the theorem it is enough to show that the tree value is the unique value that meets FTE on G Γ N . Let a value ξ on G Γ N satisfy axiom FTE. Then, because of FTE, (2) holds for every v, Γ ∈ G Γ N . Every digraph Γ under consideration is cycle-free, i.e., no player in N appears to be a successor of itself. Hence, due to the arbitrariness of game v, Γ , the n equalities in (2) are independent. Therefore, we have a system of n independent linear equalities with respect to n variables ξ j (v, Γ ) which uniquely determines the value ξ(v, Γ ) that in this case coincides with t(v, Γ ).
Corollary 4 FTE on the class of cycle-free digraph games G Γ N implies not only MTE but SE as well.
Remark 1 Observe that the inessential links independence of the tree value can be also obtained as a corollary to Theorem 3.
Overall efficiency and stability
In this subsection we consider efficiency and stability of the tree value. First we derive for the tree value the total payoff for any t-connected coalition.
Given a digraph Γ and a t-connected coalition S ⊆ N , we definē
and let for every i ∈S Γ (S), d S (i) be the in-degree of i in the subgraph Γ |S Γ (S) , i.e.,
Remark that for all i ∈ N , d N (i) = d Γ (i).
Theorem 4 In a cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N , for any t-connected coalition
If the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, then for any t-connected coalition S ∈ C t Γ (N ) it holds that
Proof. Let v, Γ ∈ G Γ N be a cycle-free digraph game and let S be any t-connected coalition S ∈ C t Γ (N ). Then it holds that i∈S t i (v, Γ )
Since S ∈ C t Γ (N ), for all i, j ∈ S with j ∈ S Γ (i) every path from i to j belongs to S. Then, from the last equality it follows that
Next, due to Lemma 1, κ ji = 0 for all j ∈ P Γ (i) ∩S Γ (S) \F Γ (i) with d j (i) = 1 and κ ji = 1 for j ∈ F Γ (i) ∩S Γ (S). Whence it follows that κ i,S = 1 when d Γ (i) = 1.
In case Γ is a strongly cycle-free digraph, it holds that
To complete the proof of (10) it suffices to notice that, since Γ is a strongly cyclefree digraph, every immediate successor j ∈ F Γ (i) of i ∈ S that does not belong to S is a source inS Γ (S)\S.
From Theorem 4 it follows that for any cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N the overall efficiency is given by
while if the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, (11) reduces to
To support these expressions we recall the Myerson model in [6] of a game with undirected cooperation structure, in which the component efficiency entails the equality
While the right-side expression in (13) is composed by connected components that are the only efficient productive elements in the Myerson's model, the building bricks in (11) and (12) are the full successors sets which are the only efficient productive coalitions under the assumption of t-connectedness. Observe also that for strongly cycle-free rooted-forest digraph games (12) reduces to (13),
For a cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N , we define the t-core C t (v, Γ ) as the set of component efficient payoff vectors that are not dominated by any t-connected coalition,
while the weak t-coreC t (v, Γ ) is the set of component feasible payoff vectors that are not dominated by any t-connected coalition,
Theorem 5 The tree value on the subclass of superadditive rooted-forest digraph games is t-stable.
Proof. Let v, Γ ∈ G Γ N be a superadditive rooted-forest digraph game arbitrarily chosen. We show that the tree value t(v, Γ ) belongs to the core C t (v, Γ ). Consider arbitrary C ∈ N/Γ , then C is a tree. Let i ∈ C be a source in Γ , then C =S Γ (i) because of the rooted-forest structure of Γ . Due to the full-tree efficiency of the tree value, it holds that
Let now S ∈ C t Γ (N ). Because of the rooted-forest structure of Γ , it holds that d N (i) = 1 for all i ∈ N \R Γ (N ). Wherefrom it follows that Γ | S contains exactly one source, say, node i, Γ | S is a subtree, and S ⊆S Γ (i). Moreover, since Γ is strongly cycle-free, Γ |S Γ (i) is a full subtree, and because of the tree structure of Γ | S , Γ |S Γ (i)\S consists of a collection (might be empty) of disconnected full subtrees, i.e., Γ |S
Applying again the full-tree efficiency of the tree value, we obtain that
for all k = 1, . . . , q.
From the superadditivity of v and the last three equalities, it follows that
Remark 2
The statement of Theorem 5 can also be obtained as a corollary of the stability result proved in Demange [2] . Indeed, in a rooted forest every connected component has a tree structure and, therefore, is t-connected. Whence, for any rooted-forest digraph game the t-core coincides with the core of the Myerson restricted game.
The following examples show that for t-stability of a superadditive digraph game the requirement on the digraph to be a rooted forest is non-reducible. In Example 5 the tree value of a superadditive cycle-free but not strongly cycle-free digraph game violates individual rationality and, therefore, does not meet the second constraint of the weak t-core, while in Example 6 the tree value of a superadditive strongly cycle-free game in which the graph contains two sources violates feasibility. Then t(v, Γ ) = (−1, 1, 1, 0), whence t 1 (v, Γ ) = −1 < 0 = v(1). Remark that every singleton coalition, in particular S = {1}, is t-connected. Then t(v, Γ ) = (1, 1, 0 
A cycle-free digraph game v, Γ is t-convex, if for all t-connected coalitions T, Q ⊂ C t Γ (N ) such that T is a full t-connected set, Q is a full successors set, and
Theorem 6 The tree value on the subclass of t-convex strongly cycle-free digraph games is feasible.
Proof. Let v, Γ ∈ G Γ N be any t-convex strongly cycle-free digraph game. Assume that Γ is connected, otherwise we apply the same argument to any component C ∈ N/Γ . If there is only one source in Γ , it holds that n i=1 t i (v, Γ ) = v(N ) and the tree value is even efficient. So, suppose that there are q different sources r 1 , . . . , r q in Γ for some q ≥ 2. Since Γ is connected, the sources in Γ can be ordered in such a way that
for j = 2, ..., q.
For j = 1, ..., q let T j = j h=1S Γ (r h ). Then from the strongly cycle-freeness of Γ it follows that for j = 2, ..., q there exists a unique i j ∈ N such that
By t-convexity of the digraph game v, Γ it holds that v(T j−1 ) + v(S Γ (r j )) ≤ v(T j ) + v(S Γ (i j )), for j = 2, ..., q.
Since T 1 =S Γ (r 1 ) and T q = N , then applying the last inequality successively q − 1 times we obtain
Since Γ is strongly cycle-free, for any i ∈ N \R Γ (N ), node i has d Γ (i) different sources as predecessors, which implies that the term v(S Γ (i)) appears precisely
The following example of a convex strongly cycle-free digraph game shows that even under the assumption of convexity of a given digraph game, which is stronger than t-convexity, one or more constraints for not being dominated in the definition of the week t-core might be violated by the tree value, and therefore, the tree value is not weakly t-stable. Then t(v, Γ ) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0), whence, the total payoff t 1 (v, Γ ) + t 2 (v, Γ ) + t 3 (v, Γ ) of t-connected coalition S = {1, 2, 3} is equal to 2 which is smaller than v(S) that is equal to 3.
From (11) it follows that for a cycle-free (for simplicity connected) digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N a necessary and sufficient condition for the feasibility of the tree value is that
Since N = i∈R Γ (N )S Γ (i), the grand coalition equals the union of the successors sets of all sources in the graph Γ . In case there is only one source in Γ , condition (17) is redundant, because the left side is then equal to v(N ). In case there is more than one source in Γ , the different successors sets of the sources of Γ will intersect each other and for any i ∈ N \R Γ (N ) the number κ i,N − 1 is the number of times that the successors setS Γ (i) of node i equals the intersection of successors sets of the sources of Γ . Therefore, condition (17) is a kind of convexity condition for the grand coalition saying that the sum of the worths of the successors sets of all the sources of the graph should be less than or equal to the worth of the grand coalition (their union) plus the total worths of their intersections. In a firm where any full successors set of a source is a division within the firm and subdivisions that are intersections of several divisions are shared by these divisions, in (17) the left-side minus the sum in the right-side can be economically interpreted as the total worths of the divisions when they do not cooperate, while v(N ) is the worth of the firm when the divisions do cooperate. To have feasibility the latter value should be at least equal to the former value. Remark that v(N ) minus the total payoff at the tree value can be interpreted as the net profit of the firm (or the synergy effect from cooperation) that can be given to its shareholders.
Web values
We consider now the general case of an arbitrary management team in a given cycle-free directed communication graph.
To any digraph Γ on N and management team M ∈ M(Γ ) we associate the digraph (i) it obeys the recursive equality
(ii) it admits the explicit representation in the form
where for all i ∈ N and j ∈ S Γ (i), κ ij is defined by (3) .
From now on we refer to the value w given by (19) as to the M -web value for cycle-free digraph games.
According to (18) the web value assigns to any successor of the given management team the worth of his full successors set minus the total payoff to his successors, to any predecessor of the management team the worth of his full predecessors set minus the total payoff to his predecessors, and to any member of the management team the worth of his full web minus the total payoff to his subordinates. Wherefrom we obtain a simple recursive algorithm for computing the web value by going upstream from the sinks and downstream from the sources till the chosen management team is reached.
The next theorem provides an explicit representation of the M -web value.
Theorem 8 For any cycle-free digraph game v, Γ, M ∈ G Γ,M N , the M -web value w(v, Γ, M ) given by (19) admits the equivalent representation in the form
If the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, then the above representation reduces to
The M -web value assigns to every successor of a given management team the payoff equal to the worth of his full successors set minus the worths of all full successors sets of his proper immediate successors plus or minus the worths of all full successors sets of any other of his successors that are subtracted or added more than once. The M -web value assigns to every predecessor of a given management team the payoff equal to the worth of his full predecessors set minus the worths of all full predecessors sets of his proper immediate predecessors plus or minus the worths of all full predecessors sets of any other of his predecessors that are subtracted or added more than once. The M -web value assigns to every manager of a given management team the payoff equal to the worth of his full web minus the worths of all full successors sets of his proper immediate successors plus or minus the worths of all full successors sets of any other of his successors that are subtracted or added more than once and minus the worths of all full predecessors sets of his proper direct predecessors plus or minus the worths of all full predecessors sets of any other of his predecessors that are subtracted or added more than once. Moreover, for any player i ∈S Γ (M ) and his successor j ∈ S Γ (i) that is not his proper immediate successor, the coefficient κ i (j) indicates the number of overlappings of full successors sets of all proper immediate successors of i at node j. While for any player i ∈P Γ (M ) and his predecessor j ∈ P Γ (i) that is not his proper immediate predecessor, the coefficient κ i (j) indicates the number of overlappings of full predecessors sets of all proper immediate predecessors of i at node j. In fact each player receives what he contributes when he joins his sudordinates when we count only the efficient productive coalitions that are either full webs, full successors sets, or full predecessors sets. Besides, it is worth to note and not difficult to check that the right sides of both formulas (20) and (21) being considered with respect not to coalitional worths but to players in these coalitions contain only player i when taking into account all pluses and minuses. The M -web value not only meets WE, WFTE and WFSE but also that these three efficiency properties alone uniquely define the M -web value on the class of cycle-free digraph games G Γ,M N .
Theorem 9 On the class of cycle-free digraph games G Γ,M N the M -web value w is the unique value that satisfies WE, WFTE and WFSE. 
Theorem 10 The M -web value on the subclass of superadditive line-graph games is M -web stable.
However, for M -web stability of a superadditive digraph game the requirement on the digraph to be a line-graph is non-reducible.
Theorem 11 The M -web value on the subclass of M -web-convex strongly cycle-free digraph games G Γ ,M N is feasible.
Remark that if the management team is composed by the set of all sinks in a given graph, web connectedness can be restated in terms of sink connectedness when for a digraph Γ a connected coalition S ∈ C Γ (N ) is sink connected, or simply s-connected, if it meets the condition that for every sink i ∈ L Γ (S) it holds that i / ∈ P Γ (j) for another source j ∈ L Γ (S). In this case web efficiency reduces to maximal sink efficiency, web predecessor equivalence to predecessor equivalence, web efficiency together with web full-sink efficiency provide full sink efficiency, axioms of web successor equivalence and web full-tree efficiency become redundant, and the M -web core reduces to the s-core C s (v, Γ ) defined as the set of component efficient payoff vectors that are not dominated by any s-connected coalition, 
For sink-forest digraph games defined by sink forest digraph structures that are strongly cycle-free, the value given by (25) coincides with the sink value introduced in Khmelnitskaya [5] . By that reason from now on we refer to the value s given by (23), or equivalently by (24), as to the sink-tree value, or simply the sink value, for cycle-free digraph games.
For the sink value it holds that for any cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N the overall efficiency is given by
while if the consideration is restricted to only strongly cycle-free digraph games, the last equality reduces to
Theorem 12 The sink value on the subclass of superadditive sink-forest digraph games is s-stable.
The average web value
In this section we introduce the average web value for cycle-free directed graphs. This value only depends on a given TU game and digraph.
For any cycle-free digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N , the average web value (AW-value) is defined as the average of M -web values over the set M(Γ ) of all management teams in the digraph Γ , i.e.,
It is not difficult to see that the AW-value inherits the independence of inessential links property from M -web values. Moreover, since convexity of a digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N is stronger then M -web-convexity with respect to any management team M ∈ M(Γ ), we obtain from Theorem 11 the next theorem.
Theorem 13 On the class of convex strongly cycle-free digraph games G Γ N the AWvalue is feasible.
The average tree solution (AT solution) for undirected cycle-free graph games, introduced in Herings et al. [4] , assigns to any cycle-free graph game v, Γ to player i ∈ N the average of his tree value payoffs in all rooted spanning trees in the subgraph (N/Γ ) i , Γ | (N/Γ ) i :
where, for j ∈ (N/Γ ) i , T (j) is the rooted tree on (N/Γ ) i with j as root and composed of all links of (N/Γ ) i , Γ | (N/Γ ) i with orientation directed away from the root and t is the tree value given by (8).
In Herings et al. [4] it is shown that the AT solution defined on the class of superadditive cycle-free graph games is stable, and that on the entire class of cyclefree graph games the AT solution is characterized via component efficiency and component fairness. Theorem 14 The AW-value for a digraph game v, Γ ∈ G Γ N coincides with the AT solution for the corresponding undirected graph game v,Γ , i.e., AW (v, Γ ) = AT (v,Γ ), if and only if Γ is a line-graph.
Proof. In a line-graph Γ on N every management team is a singleton and the web value relevant to each management team coincides with the tree value to the corresponding undirected graphΓ . Besides, in a line-graph Γ on N the total number of management teams in Γ is equal to n, i.e., |M(Γ )| = n. Moreover, every digraph in which all management teams are singletons is a line-graph and conversely.
Since on the subclass of line-graph games the requirement of WE coincides with CE, we obtain from Theorem 14 and the axiomatization of the AT solution the next theorem.
Theorem 15 On the subclass of line-graph games v, Γ ∈ G Γ N the AW-value is characterized by WE and CF and, moreover, on the subclass of superadditive linegraph games v, Γ ∈ G Γ N the AW-value is stable.
7 Sharing a river with multiple sources, a delta and possible islands Ambec and Sprumont [1] approach the problem of optimal water allocation for a given river with certain capacity over the agents (cities, countries) located along the river from the game theoretic point of view. Their model assumes that between each pair of neighboring agents there is an additional inflow of water. Each agent, in principal, can use all the inflow between itself and its upstream neighbor, however, this allocation in general is not optimal in respect to total welfare. To obtain a more profitable allocation it is allowed to allocate more water to downstream agents which in turn can compensate the extra water obtained by side-payments to upstream ones. The problem of optimal water allocation is approached as the problem of optimal welfare distribution. Van den Brink et al. [7] show that the Ambec-Sprumont river game model can be naturally embedded into the framework of a graph game with line-graph cooperation structure. In Khmelnitskaya [5] the line-graph river model is extended to the rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph model of a river with a delta or with multiple sources, respectively. We extend the line-graph, rooted-tree or sinktree model of a river to the cycle-free digraph model of a river with both multiple sources and a delta, and also possible islands along the river bed as well.
Let N be a set of players (users of water) located along the river from upstream to downstream. Let e ki ≥ 0, i ∈ N , k ∈ O(i), be the inflow of water in front of the most upstream player(s) when k = 0, or the inflow of water entering the river between neighboring players when player k is in front of player i. Figure 9 provides a schematic representation of the model. e i+1,i+2 e i+2,i+5
Figure 9
A river with multiple sources, a delta, and several islands along the river bed.
Following Ambec and Sprumont [1] it is assumed that each player i ∈ N has a quasi-linear utility function given by u i (x i , t i ) = b i (x i ) + t i where t i is a monetary compensation to player i, x i is the amount of water allocated to player i, and b i : IR + → IR is a continuous nondecreasing function providing benefit b i (x i ) to player i when he consumes the amount x i of water. Moreover, in case of a river with a delta it is also assumed that if a splitting of the river into branches happens to occur after a certain player, then this player takes, besides his own quota, also the responsibility to split the rest of the water flow to the branches such to guarantee the realization of the water distribution plan x * to his successors.
The superadditive river game v ∈ G N introduced under the same assumptions in Khmelnitskaya [5] for a river with multiple sources or a delta defined as: suits to the case of a river with both multiple sources and a delta, and also possible islands along the river bed as well. The tree and sink values proposed above can be applied for the solution of the river game in the general case.
